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Struggling for land access: The success and failure of social move-
ment actors’ framing strategies in conflicts over large-scale land
transformationsLouisa Prause
Abstract 
Struggles over meaning construction are an essential part of conflicts over large-scale
land transformations. To advance the land access claims of local communities, social
movement actors engage in specific framing strategies to mobilize resources and support.
This article explores how the discursive context shapes the success or failure of social
movement actors’ framing strategies in conflicts over large-scale mining and agro-
indus trial projects. Discursive opportunity structures (DOS) and framing are the key
the o retical concepts used. I argue that the outcomes of framing strategies can only be
un derstood when we combine DOS with a thorough analysis of social movement actors’
ability to act on the opportunities provided by discursive structures. Empirically, the study
compares conflicts over gold mining and agro-industry in Senegal. Some elements of the
discursive structures differ depending on the purpose of the large-scale land
trans for ma tion in question and as such provide distinct opportunities for social movement
actors. Other elements of the discursive structure are tied to large-scale land transfor-
ma tions in general. As the empirical analysis shows, not all social movement actors can
use these opportunities in the same way. The article contributes to our understanding of
the importance of discourses and framing strategies in conflicts over large-scale land
transformations. Conceptually, I explore the strengths and weaknesses of a theoretical
framework combining DOS and framing. 
Zusammenfassung
Konflikte um großflächige Landtransformationen zugunsten von Bergbau und
Agrarindustrie haben in den letzten Jahren stark zugenommen. Dieser Artikel untersucht
die diskursive Dimension dieser Konflikte. Im Zentrum steht die Frage nach dem Erfolg
oder Misserfolg von framing Strategien sozialer Bewegungsakteure. Ob framing Strate-
gien erfolgreich sind oder nicht lässt sich einerseits anhand von diskursiven Gelegen-
heitsstrukturen (DOS) erklären. Andererseits beeinflussen die Konstruktion ihrer
Zukunftsvisionen und Fähigkeiten unterschiedlicher Bewegungsakteure, sowie ihrer
Gegenspieler_innen, inwiefern Bewegungsakteure sich mit ihren Forderungen durchset-
zen können. Empirisch wird ein Konflikt um eine Goldmine mit einem Konflikt um ein
agrarindustrielles Projekt im Senegal verglichen. Dieser Vergleich zeigt, dass DOS un ter-
schiedlich ausgestaltet sind, abhängig vom Zweck der Inwertsetzung von Land, also für
Bergbau oder Agrarindustrie. Gleichzeitig gibt es Gemeinsamkeiten in den Diskursen, in
Bezug auf die Abwägung von sozialen und ökologischen Risiken. Diese übergreifende
Struktur der Diskurse kann jedoch von unterschiedlichen Akteuren nicht gleichermaßen
genutzt werden. Der Artikel leistet einen Beitrag zum Verständnis der Bedeutung von
Diskursen und framing Strategien in Konflikten um großflächige Landtransformationen.
Gleichzeitig werden Stärken und Schwächen eines theoretischen Rahmens aufgezeigt,
der DOS und framing kombiniert. 
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We are currently witnessing a global ‘land rush’ that is transforming vast tracts of land
for the purpose of agro-industrial crop production and mining. The lands seized for these
purposes are usually not empty and unoccupied; rather, such lands often provide resources
central to the preexisting livelihoods and well-being of those living in or from these
ter ri tories (Bebbington/Bury 2013:11; Borras/Franco 2013). As such, the increasing
val orization of land for agro-industrial or mining uses is being accompanied by increasing
conflict. 
Land-based resources determine the purpose of extraction, but they also interact with pre-
extraction political economies (Bebbington/Bury 2013). Groups of local communities
will have used the land and its resources for economic purposes, but will have also
as signed cultural meaning to them. Political ecologists have stressed the importance of
discourses and knowledge in conflicts over nature (Escobar 1996). Indeed, “beliefs, ide o-
logical controls and discursive practices, as well as negotiated systems of meaning, shape
all forms of access” to resources (Ribot/Peluso 2003: 168). Social movement actors
sup porting local communities’ claims for land access construct specific frames, “schemata
of interpretation” (Goffman 1974: 464), to win over allies and mobilize organizational
and financial resources. The principal question that this article addresses is therefore not
if discourses shape access to land but rather how they shape the outcome of framing
con tests in conflicts over large-scale land transformations. 
I aim to explain why some framing strategies put forward by social movement actors
suc ceed while others fail, even though the movements might mobilize in a similar national
and cultural context. I compare the framing strategies of social movement actors
strug gling for land access for local communities in conflicts over large-scale land trans for-
mations for mining and agro-industrial purposes. This article shows that different
dis courses are connected to the specific purpose of the land transformations. This partly
explains the success or failure of social movement actors’ framing strategies, since they
face different opportunity structures. Nevertheless, some discursive opportunities are
sim ilar in both sectors. Here, success and failure can only be fully understood when the
abilities of movement actors to make use of discursive opportunities are taken into
ac count. My re search is based on an empirical case study from Senegal. With this article,
I aim to con tribute to research on meaning construction and discourses in conflicts over
large-scale land transformation. 
Most contributions that analyze meaning construction in conflicts over large-scale land
transformations for agro-industrial purposes (land grabbing) have thus far been rather
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de scriptive and provide little explanation for the success or failure of specific framing
strategies. Contributors argue that presenting land as idle and unused is an important
frame to legitimate large-scale land transformations for agro-industrial purposes (Borras
Jr/Franco 2012; Borras et al. 2010; Li 2014; Neef/Touch 2012). Carol Hunsberger and
Alberto Alonso-Fradejas (2016) show how the cultivation of flex crops allows companies
to strategically shift their alignment to different discourses. Depending on the context,
they refer to dominant discourses of food security or climate change mitigation, since oil
palm can be used for cooking as well as biofuel production. Social movements struggling
against such projects, on the other hand, try to make visible the variety of local land uses,
from pastoralism to small-scale agriculture, for the sustainable use of wild plants, as bio-
diversity reserves, etc. (e.g. Pye 2010). 
In the literature on conflicts over mining, several authors stress that for a social move-
ment’s success, it is important to locate the problems related to mining on a specific scale.
Movement actors reframe their claims in relation to the audience they want to reach, at
the local, national or international level (Haarstad/Fløysand 2007), or establish new scales
of meaning in their framing to push for a change in the scales of regulation (Urkidi 2011;
Urkidi 2010). Furthermore, movement actors tap into different dominant discourses such
as biodiversity, national identity and democracy discourses to legitimate their claims (e.g.
Haarstad/Fløysand 2007; Buchanan 2013). However, frames suggesting an alternative
land use such as biodiversity conservation are only convincing if there is indeed an im por-
tant occurrence of biodiversity in the area. Frames are as such tied to the specific material
conditions of a place (Davidov 2014). So far, a comparison between struggles over agro-
industrial and mining projects is missing in the literature. It therefore remains unclear if
and how discourses differ according to the purpose of land valorization. Furthermore, the
literature does not offer a sufficient explanation of how and why some discourses be come
dominant in a certain context, while others do not. Finally, we know little about why
some movement actors are able to use given discursive opportunities, while others are
not. 
To respond to these gaps in the current research on conflicts over large-scale land trans-
formations, I combine two analytical concepts from social movement theory: framing
and discursive opportunity structures (DOS). Conceptually, this article intervenes in the
debate on framing in the study of contentious politics by suggesting that framing
out comes cannot be explained either by the discursive context or by the framing strategies
of social movement actors alone, but only through a careful analysis of both dimensions.
Drawing on the concepts of DOS and framing (Benford/Snow 2000), I argue that differ-
ences in the outcomes of framing strategies are as much dependent on the discursive
con text as on the counter-framings of social movement opponents, frictions within social
movements, and the specific visions for future land use put forward by social movements. 
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Empirically, I analyze two cases from Senegal: the conflicts around the Sabodala gold
mine and over the Senhuile agro-industrial project. Data on both cases was collected
dur ing three periods of field research in April-May 2014, February-April 2015, and
March-May 2016. I conducted 63 non-standardized interviews in Dakar and in the two
areas where the Senhuile project and Sabodala mine are being implemented: in the de part-
ments of St. Louis and Kédougou respectively. Interviewees were representatives of
min istries and subordinate government authorities, business associations, non-
govern mental organizations (NGOs) and local initiatives, employees and (ex-) workers
of the Senhuile and Sabodala companies, as well as artisanal miners, pastoralists and res-
idents affected by both projects. Additional information was gathered during seven focus
group discussions, informal meetings and observations at both project sites . In addition,
the analysis is based on articles in the Senegalese and international press, reports by na-
tional institutions, and documents from Senegalese NGOs. Furthermore, I conducted a
thorough analysis of the Senegalese mining law (code minier), the land law (loi sur la
domaine na tionale) and the environmental law (code environnementale), as well as the
national development plan (Plan Sénégalais Emérgent, PSE) and its concrete policy pro-
gram the Programme d'Accélération de la Cadence de l'Agriculture Sénégalaise (PRA-
CAS) in the agricultural sector. A similar policy program does not exist for the mining
sector. 
The article is structured as follows. I start out with some conceptual reflections on the
key theoretical terms of this article, namely ‘discursive opportunity structures’ and
‘fram ing’. I then identify key elements of the DOS in which the respective conflicts are
embedded. Subsequently, I turn to the conflicts around the Senhuile project and
the  Sabodala gold mine and analyze the framing strategies of supporters and opponents
in both cases with regard to the DOS. In conclusion, I summarize the outcomes of my
empirical analysis and discuss the usefulness of a framework that combines DOS and
framing in the study of conflicts over agro-industrial and mining projects. 
Analyzing claim-making processes: Framing and discursive
opportunity structures
For the empirical analysis of the claim-making process in conflicts over the valorization
of gold and land in Senegal, I build upon concepts from social movement theory. Frame
analysis has been proposed by social movement theorists to investigate how contentious
actors interpret certain political realities and how they use these interpretations to mobilize
support. The framing perspective builds upon the constructivist principle that meanings
do not naturally attach themselves to the objects, events, or experiences that people
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en counter. Instead, they arise through the interpretative activities of actors (Snow 2004).
Frames refer to the organization of forms of experiences and the interpretation of
sit u a tions (Goffman 1974). 
A key argument of the framing approach is that mobilization does not occur automatically
where objective grievances exist. Instead, mobilization is a result of the way in which
social actors discursively define and communicate those grievances (Snow et al. 1986b).
Social movement actors “frame, or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and
conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to
garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists’’ (Snow/Benford 1988: 198).
Frames are instrumental means for contentious actors to achieve goals that are largely
negotiated prior to the framing process. 
Benford and Snow (2000) introduced three dimensions of collective action frames:
di ag nostic, prognostic and motivational framing. Diagnostic framing attempts to identify
the causes of a specific problem and attribute blame. Prognostic framing proposes a course
of action and possible solutions to the problem. Motivational framing finally calls for
collective action and support for the movement (Benford/Snow 2000: 616-617). Frames
may or may not include all three dimensions. For a frame to be effective, it needs to be
credible as well as salient. Benford and Snow identify three factors that impact the
cred i bility of a frame: its consistency, its empirical credibility and the credibility of the
frame articulators and claims makers (Benford/Snow 2000: 619). A frame’s salience to
its targets is affected by its centrality, experiential commensurability and narrative fidelity
(Snow/Benford 1988). 
To achieve frame credibility and salience, and as such effectively advance their claims
and interests, social movements engage in strategic processes. David Snow et al. (1986)
conceptualized these as frame alignment processes and identified four basic strategies:
frame bridging, frame extension, frame transformation, and frame amplification. Frame
bridging refers to the linking of at least two ideologically congruent but structurally un-
connected frames regarding a particular issue or problem (Benford/Snow 2000: 634).
With frame extension, social movements aim to depict their interests as extending beyond
their primary concerns to include issues that are presumed to be of importance to potential
adherents. Frame transformation refers to changing old understandings and meanings and
generating new ones (Benford/Snow 2000: 625). Finally, frame amplification refers to
the idealization, clarification, or invigoration of existing values and beliefs (Snow et al.
1986b). 
To be successful, a frame needs to be culturally resonant. With the exception of frame
amplification, the strategic processes identified by Benford and Snow all explain the
suc cess or failure of social movements’ frames in terms of their own choices and capa bil i-
ties to construct framings that are credible and salient. This implies that to mobilize others
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and advance their claims, social movements merely have to construct the right frames
(Oliver/Johnston 2000). Mirjam Werner und Joep Cornelissen (2014: 453) argue that “the
overall result of this strategic view of framing is the tautological argument that those who
won framing contests simply employed the most resonant frames.” This conception of
framing certainly neglects the fact that social movements always operate within a specific
social, cultural and political context. Much of the framing research fails to take seriously
the constraints and incentives that are imposed on social movements by the political and
discursive opportunities presented to them (Jaspers 1997). Furthermore, the process of
frame amplification remains vaguely defined, as it is unclear how to identify the existing
values and beliefs that actually matter for social movements and how social movements
succeed in constructing frames that are culturally resonant.
To explain the success or failure of certain frames in advancing a movement’s claims, we
need a more theoretical approach to the often mentioned cultural context. I therefore com-
bine the framing approach with the concept of discursive opportunity structures (DOS).
The idea is that a movement’s frame and the political and cultural environment in which
it is expressed work in combination to produce a movement’s desired political outcome
(McCammon et al. 2007: 726). The concept combines the political opportunity structures
(POS) approach with discourse theory. The POS approach is built on the assumption that
the political institutional context of social movements’ actions is crucial for explaining
their formation, development and success (cf. Kriesi 2004; Tarrow 1996). Koopman und
Stratham (1999) argue that it is not only the political institutions but also the cultural and
discursive context that constitute opportunity structures. DOS “may be seen as
de ter min ing which ideas are considered ‘sensible’, which constructions of reality are seen
as ‘realistic’, and which claims are held as ‘legitimate’ within a certain polity at a specific
time” (ibid.: 228). The concept of DOS thus introduces an important distinction between
frames and the larger system of meaning. To succeed, movement actors must incorporate
and respond to critical discursive elements in the broader cultural and political context
(McCammon et al. 2007). Like the POS approach, DOS also emphasizes the role of
struc ture. However, structure itself can never be the cause of action. Rather, discursive
structures become opportunities when movement actors recognize them and make the
conscious decision to respond to them (Ferree 2003). 
In the literature, very different factors have been treated as DOS. One strand of literature
analyses the structure of mass media as DOS (Motta 2015; Koopmans 2004;
Koopmans/Olzak 2004). Others focus on institutionalized discourses, either through
pol icy regulations (Motta 2015), court decisions (Ferree et al. 2002) or long-term socio-
cultural elements (McCammon et al. 2007). Holly McCammon et al. (2007) go so far as
to analyze opposition framing as DOS, something that I argue is clearly based on a second
party’s actions and is therefore not an independent structure.
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DOS may explain the success or failure of frames proposed by certain movement actors
in a certain national context at a specific point in time. In this article, I define DOS
fol low ing Myra Marx Ferree (2003: 309) as “institutionally anchored ways of thinking
that provide a gradient of relative political acceptability to specific packages of ideas.”
As such, a discursive structure is a strand of a broader discourse that becomes relevant
for social movements’ actions through its institutionally backed power in a certain
the matic field. Discursive opportunities can be made up by one or more discursive
struc tures. I argue that these institutionally anchored ways of thinking can best be
an a lyzed as policies and laws, as these provide longer-term structures backed by
in sti tu tional power (Ferree 2003; Motta 2015).
However, we cannot simply derive successful claim-making from the presence of DOS.
As Ferree (2003) stresses, DOS always work in combination with the actual framing
ef forts of social movements. The effectiveness of the articulated frames depends on their
alignment with discursive opportunities that open up in certain moments in time. How-
ever, this alignment can be done more or less skillfully and combined with other strategies,
as identified by Benford and Snow (2000), such as frame bridging or frame extension. I
therefore propose a combined analysis of DOS and social movements’ framing strategies,
as well as the framing strategies of their opponents, in order to understand the success or
failure of a movement’s frame. 
Operationalizing DOS and outcomes for conflicts over land in Senegal
My analysis focuses on the current Senegalese mining and land laws with regard to the
principles guiding the government’s decision on whether to attribute land to a large-scale
project or not. Large-scale land transformations in the Global South are always negotiated
in terms of national development (Haarstad/Fløysand 2007; Deonandan 2015;
Huns berger/Alonso-Fradejas 2016). National development policies are closely tied to the
question of land use, promoting certain kinds of land use as opposed to others. I therefore
argue that the specific DOS for actors involved in struggles over land are not only made
up by national laws regarding land attribution, but also by national development policy.
This policy is itself the outcome of previous social struggles and is strongly influenced
by international agencies such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and national Western donor agencies. 
Large-scale land transformation for agricultural but also mining purposes in Senegal must
first be evaluated through an environmental and social impact study (Code Minier, § 26,
28; Code de l’Environment, Chapitre V). As such, the common denominator of the insti-
tutionally anchored discourse on large-scale mining and agriculture is that decisions for
or against agro-industrial and mining projects must be based on an assessment of the risks
for the local populations and the environment. However, regarding their contribution to
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national development, the policy discourses regarding mining and agriculture differ. For
the agricultural sector, the Plan Sénégalais Emérgent and the policy programs based on
this national development plan stress the imperative of the most productive land use to
achieve food security for the local population and independence from food imports (Plan
Sénégalais Emergent § 258, Plan d’Action Prioritaires). In the national agricultural
de vel opment policy PRACAS, the main objective is defined as “to nourish the population
in a sustainable manner and on an endogenous basis” (PRACAS). One of its central aims
is to achieve self-sufficiency in terms of rice (auto suffisance en riz) and onions. On the
other hand, with regard to mining, the national development plan PSE stresses the
fi nan cial contribution of the sector in terms of revenue, taxes and employment (Plan
Séné galais Emérgent, § 262). Here the grounding principle is that financial gain for the
national state will enable the government to invest in further development projects. Both
cases – large-scale mining and agriculture – thus have an identical component in their
discursive struc ture based on risks for the environment and local populations; they differ,
however, in their emphasis on two different aspects of national development. Given that
the cultural context is similar in both cases, I evaluate whether differences in the
de vel op ment dis course provide a satisfactory explanation for the success or failure of the
framing strate gies of both movements’ actors. 
To evaluate the success and failure of both movements, I propose a qualitative approach
based on the concrete aims and means of the respective movements. A universal definition
of what constitutes the success or failure of a social movement is so far missing in the
lit erature. Movement success has been analyzed in terms of protests staged, visibility in
the media, members and financial resources mobilized, changes of laws or in discourses,
etc. (Bernstein 2003). I argue that movement success can best be evaluated according to
the concrete objectives formulated by a movement. The aims of both movements’ actors
in Senegal have been to advance and secure the land claims of local populations, either
by stopping large-scale land transformations or by reaching a compensation agreement
that would grant local populations access to alternative lands or adequate monetary
com pensation. Neither movements’ actors aimed to mobilize for long-term protests and
large-scale demonstrations. Rather, they intended to gather support from other national
and international NGOs and initiatives and garner media attention. As such, I evaluate
success and failure first and foremost based on the overall objectives of the movements:
were projects stopped, downscaled, or alternative lands or adequate compensation pay-
ments given to the local populations that lost their land? Second, I conceptualize success
based on the strategies used by the social movements to achieve their overall objectives:
have social movement actors attracted support from other national and international
NGOs? And have they achieved strong visibility for their claims in the national
and  international media? 
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As we will see in the following paragraphs, the movement against the Senhuile
agro- industrial project has been considerably more successful than the movement against
the Sabodala gold mine in attaining media attention, gathering support from other orga ni-
zations, and successfully delaying, stopping or downscaling projects. 
In the following sections I first turn to the conflict around the Senhuile agro-industrial
project. I briefly sketch the development of the conflict around the project and then
an a lyze the framing strategies of both the coalition against land grabbing and supporters
of the project with regard to the DOS. I then turn to the conflict around the Sabodala gold
mine. After a brief outline of the development of the mining sector in Senegal
more  ge n erally, I turn to the framing strategies used in the conflict around the Sabodala
mine in particular. 
Conflicts over agricultural projects in Senegal: 
The Senhuile case
In the context of the 2008 global financial crisis, as well as the food, energy and climate
crises that began in the mid-2000s, investments in agricultural land have surged. This
in crease has been particularly strong in Africa (Cotula 2013), and Senegal is no exception.
Large-scale land acquisitions and industrial agriculture had a minimal presence in Senegal
prior to the mid-2000s. However, from 2006 onward, several international and national
investors started trying to acquire land in Senegal. These dynamics have not only been
fostered by a multi-faceted crisis of capitalism, but also by national politics.
Former  president Abdoulaye Wade introduced his program to foster large-scale industrial
agriculture in 2006 under the name Grand Offensive National Agricole (GOANA),
en couraging international and national investors to acquire land in Senegal and providing
detailed support for land acquisitions for international investors through the national
in vestment agency Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements et Grands Travaux
(APIX). Such national initiatives were seen in many African countries at the time. They
were encouraged by international donor agencies such as the World Bank, which stressed
in a well-publicized report the economic potential of idle and empty lands in Africa
(Deiniger/Byerlee 2010). 
Estimates about the scope of land deals in Senegal vary strongly. Land Matrix (2015)
es timates that 250,000 ha have been taken over by international companies since 2000.
NGOs in Senegal estimate that the land use rights of 844,976 ha have changed since 2000;
their estimates include land leased by religious leaders or national political elites (ENDA
PRONAT 2015). When international companies are involved, land is mainly transformed
for the purpose of food crop production for the European market.
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Large-scale land deals have been highly contentious in Senegal. Following the World
So cial Forum 2011 in Dakar, about 20 civil society organizations in Senegal, local peasant
initiatives and the national peasant organization Conseil National de Concertation et de
cooperation des Ruraux (CNCR) organized themselves into a network against land grab-
bing, the Cade de Réflextion et d’Action sur le Foncier au Sénégal (CRAFS). They have
successfully prevented several large-scale land deals in Senegal (ENDA PRONAT 2015).
Currently, the most contentious project in the country is the Senhuile project. 
In 2011, Senhuile initially planned to lease 20,000 ha in the municipality of Fanaye to
grow sweet potatoes for biofuel production. However, after several demonstrations,
vi o lent confrontations and a widely heard media campaign organized by CRAFS, former
president Wade stopped the project and relocated it to the nature reserve of Ndiael in the
municipality of Gnith via two presidential decrees. Parts of the Ndiael nature reserve are
protected under the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance (RAMSAR) for
the conservation of endangered wetlands. In the first of his presidential decrees, former
president Wade downgraded some of the land from its status as a nature reserve, wherein
agricultural activities had been forbidden. This allowed him, in his second presidential
decree, to lease the land to Senhuile for 50 years, and without charging the company any
rent (ActionAid 2014). After the relocation of the project to the Ndiael reserve in 2012,
Senhuile aimed to cultivate sunflowers destined for oil production in Italy. However, this
plan was abandoned by the company. When the management changed in 2014 they started
producing rice, maize and peanuts for the local market on 2000 hectares (Interview,
rep re sentative of Senhuile, 06 February 2015, Dakar). After yet another change in
man agement in 2016, the company is now planning to extend and restructure its crop
production. 
Before the arrival of the Senhuile project, the land in Ndiael had been used by pastoralists.
Thirty-seven villages with a total of about 9,000 inhabitants lie inside the project area.
To contest the project, villagers formed the Collective pour la défense de la terre à Ndiael
(hereafter referred to as the Collective). They are supported by CRAFS and several in ter-
national NGOs such as GRAIN, Re:Common, ActionAid and Peuple Solidaire. Villagers
staged several small demonstrations and in 2012 blocked the Senhuile workers and their
machines as they planned to continue the clearance of the land. Their main protest
reper toire has been a media campaign informing the national and international public
about the case. The pastoralists and their allies demand the immediate cessation of the
project and the redistribution of the 20,000 ha to the local community.
To date, Senhuile is still cultivating in Ndiael. However, in 2016 the governor of St. Louis
downscaled the project to 10,000 ha. Whether this was done upon the demand of the
com pany or as a response to public pressure is unclear. Nevertheless, the government
plans to grant Senhuile a leasehold and as such stronger control over the land. How much
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the company will pay for this is still under negotiation. Even though the coalition against
land grabbing, CRAFS, could not entirely stop the Senhuile project, they have
con sid er ably delayed its development. Their struggle has attracted massive attention from
the na tional and international media (for an overview see farmlandgrab.org 10.11.2016)
and they have gained support from some major international NGOs, who in turn have
pub lished several reports on the case (ActionAid 2014; CRAFTS 2013). 
‘Idle land and productive modern agriculture’: Framing for large-scale
agricultural projects 
Supporters of the Senhuile project, mainly state officials and the company itself, present
the land in the Ndiael reserve as ‘under-used’ (sous-utiliser) (Prause 2015). They argue
that the project is bringing a previously only scarcely used and empty area under
cul ti va tion (Interview, representatives of Senhuile, 06 February 2015, Dakar). They have
framed this claim not only through text and speech acts but also in the form of a map
is sued by the government of the project area (Agence Nationale d'Amenagement du
Ter ri toire [map] 2012). Only six of the existing 37 villages are marked on the map. The
pro ject’s supporters further reduce the land use in the area to pastoralism, which in turn
is devalued as an eco nomic activity since its use of land is presented as unproductive.
Ministry officials argue that large areas of arable land in Senegal are only used by
pas toralists for a few months of the year, thus offering a big potential for more productive
land use (Interview, Ministry of Agriculture, 26 February 2015, Dakar). 
At the same time, supporters of the Senhuile project stress that the local communities
held no formal land titles to the area, and that the government had thus legally attributed
the land to Senhuile (Interview, representative of Senhuile, 06 February 2015, Dakar). It
is argued that there was no need for formal community consultations on the matter. After
the management changed in 2014, the company did initiate a corporate social
re spon si bil ity (CSR) program. They enhanced their framing efforts by presenting the
pro ject as cooperating closely with local communities and bringing social benefits to the
population of the area. They argued further that the project will benefit the community
since the company will create jobs in the area and make the necessary investments to
de velop agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation cannels. 
While the ‘idle land frame’ was particularly prominent at the time of the installation of
the project in the Ndiael reserve in 2012, in the following years Senhuile shifted towards
framing its activities more strongly in terms of productivity and economic development.
When the company started producing rice, maize and peanuts for the local market in
2014, they reframed their discourse in terms of productivity and food security. They
stressed that the project would contribute to increasing domestic rice production in
Sene gal, and as such would constitute an integral part of the government’s objective to
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achieve national self-sufficiency in rice production. This framing strategy was enhanced
by the new management in 2016. To date, Senhuile frames its activities even more
strongly in terms of productivity and agricultural know-how, stressing its professionalism,
high yields and investments (Senhuile 11 April 2016).
The ‘idle land and modern agriculture frame’ taps into the DOS on large-scale land trans-
formations in Senegal in terms of taking up the idea of productive land use and social
risks. First, they frame the land as having been idle before Senhuile arrived in the area.
As the land was previously unused and uninhabited, they argue that the project poses no
negative impacts for local communities. Instead, the project will create jobs and bring
necessary know-how to the area. Second, they present their own agricultural production
as being a major contribution to the national development goal of achieving national self-
sufficiency in rice, while simultaneously portraying pastoralism as an unproductive
ac tiv ity. Nevertheless, they do not manage to construct a convincing frame with regard
to environmental risks. Even though Senhuile states that it is supporting the protection
of the RAMSAR reserve, the company does not construct a convincing narrative of how
it is actually contributing to the protection of the reserve and the general environment.
Due to changes in the management, the Senhuile narrative also lacks consistency and
narrative fidelity and as such has major weaknesses, something that opponents of the
pro ject have been quick to exploit. 
‘Peasant agriculture’: Framing against land grabbing
CRAFS have constructed a frame that can be termed ‘peasant agriculture’. They diagnose
the threat to the livelihoods of the local pastoralists as a central problem of the Senhuile
project, presenting the loss of land as a sure way to push them further into poverty. In an
urgent appeal published by CRAFS and international NGOs supporting the coalition, they
argue that “The actions of this Italian-Senegalese company pose a grave threat to the food
sovereignty of 9000 inhabitants in the affected region.” (Peuples Solidaires, Actions Aid
2014). Their frame thereby stresses the diverse ways in which local communities use the
land. They also present an alternative map showing the 37 villages actually located in the
area, and emphasize that the local populations use the area not only for pastoralism but
also for the collection of wild fruits and medical plants (Word 2014). CRAFS presents
pastoralism as an integral part of small-scale agriculture in Senegal. 
The local communities in turn identify themselves as agro-pastoralists involved in cattle
breeding as well as farming (Focus group discussion, members of the Collective, 16
March 2015, Thiamène; see also Lo/Touré 2016). Furthermore, they present pastoralism
as an important activity for the Senegalese economy, as it creates prosperity in the
pas toralist regions and renders them independent of state support. Members of the
Col lec tive frame the land in Ndiael as a source of their identity as pastoralists. They
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em phasize that the land has been used for pastoralism by their families for several
gen er a tions, thereby stressing the importance of their connection to the land and to their
place of birth, something that is resonant for every Senegalese and even African (Focus
group discussion, Collective, 16 March 2015, Thiamène). As such, they bridge their
pas toralist identity with general Senegalese national values. 
CRAFS further states that the lack of access to land is a major reason for young
Sene galese people to try to migrate to Europe, often in small fishing boots (pirogues),
leading to many deaths at sea. Irregular migration from Senegal to the Canary Islands
has been a major issue since the mid-2000s. Several government programs have been
de signed to stop young Senegalese people from attempting this precarious passage to
Eu rope. In stressing that land loss increases rural poverty and prevents young Senegalese
from building a future in the country, CRAFS constructs a direct link between land grab-
bing and irregular migration (Focus group discussion, ENDA PRONAT, 12 February
2015, Dakar). Through these efforts of frame bridging, they connect two formerly un-
connected issues and extend the importance of land grabbing from a local and rural
phe nomenon to a national problem. 
CRAFS attributes blame to the national government, whom they present as being
re spon sible for land deals and their negative consequences, as well as to the Senhuile
company itself. The Collective presents the land allocation as illegitimate, since it was
attributed to the company without any prior formal community consultation and therefore
lacked participation and democratic legitimacy (Collective 2012). Finally, they frequently
refer to the Senhuile project as unproductive. Activists stress that Senhuile has only been
able to cultivate a few hundred hectares of the leased land, and that yields are low (Inter-
view, CNCR, 04 February 2015, Dakar; Interview, Collective, 04 February 2015, Dakar).
They take issue with the fact that the management of Senhuile is divided among different
in vestors, thus presenting it as a dubious company. This discursive move is backed by an
investigative report conducted by GRAIN on the investors behind the deal (CRAFTS
2013), which presents a somewhat shady company structure and reveals one of the
in vestors’ connections to other dubious business deals. 
CRAFS also highlights in several reports the negative impacts of the project on the
bor der ing wetlands, which are protected under the RAMSAR Convention (Word 2014).
They state that the water use of Senhuile endangers the preservation of the wetlands as
well as of the migratory birds that rely on the wetlands along their route. Additionally,
defor-est ation by Senhuile and excessive fertilizer use have come under criticism from
CRAFS. The pastoralists’ land use, on the other hand, is presented as environmentally
sustainable (ActionAid 2014). The anti-land grabbing coalition proposes the redistribution
of the land to the local communities, since they argue that small-scale agriculture
(ex plicitly including pastoralism) would use the land in a more productive way than the
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Senhuile enterprise. Activists contrast the Senhuile yields with the small-scale farms in
the neighborhood, ar guing that the small-scale farmers produced more rice per hectare
in the same amount of time than the company, even though Senhuile has much larger
fi nancial capacities at its disposal (Interview, Collective, 04 February 2015, Dakar). 
With the ‘peasant agriculture frame’, opponents of Senhuile tap into the opportunities of
the discursive structure built around risks for local communities and the environment, as
well as the development vision of achieving food security. CRAFS frames Senhuile as
presenting a threat to the local communities and the environment, and they discredit the
project as unproductive, undemocratic and shady in terms of its business model. At the
same time, they provide a convincing ‘counter-frame’ to the claims of Senhuile project
supporters of idle and underused lands in the area, using alternative maps and detailed
accounts of the economic activities of the pastoralist communities. They thereby profit
from inconsistencies in the company’s own framing. With the support of international
NGOs, CRAFS has provided evidence for many of its claims, e.g. through the investiga-
tive reports conducted by GRAIN, and the measurement of yields per hectare by small-
scale farmers in the area. As such, the peasant agriculture frame of CRAFS gains empirical
credibility. The strong ties of CRAFS to the local communities and the framing of their
identity as attached to the land of their ancestors – just as any other Senegalese – lends
them strong credibility as frame articulators and connects their problem to the national
identity. In arguing that land grabbing enhances rural poverty and is as such a key reason
for the irregular and perilous outmigration of young Senegalese, they link two structurally
unconnected frames and topics. They depict their interests as extending beyond the
con crete Senhuile case to the wider problem of irregular migration. The anti-land grab
coalition thus engages successfully in the strategies of frame bridging and frame
ex t en sion. 
The anti-land grab coalition in Senegal therefore not only effectively uses all three dis-
cursive opportunities derived from the national policy discourse, but also provides an
ef fective counter-framing of the issue, and engages in frame bridging and frame extension.
This explains the success of the movement in attracting support and media attention, and
in delaying the project several times. 
Conflicts over large-scale mining: The case of the Sabodala
gold mine
In the context of the global financial crisis, gold prices have risen to unprecedented
heights. These dynamics have led to a new gold mining boom around the world, especially
in Africa and Latin America, where investments in exploration and exploitation activities
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have risen significantly (UNECA 2011). The mining boom in West Africa has not only
been driven by high gold prices but also by a liberalization of mining legislation,
fa cil i tated in many cases by the World Bank (Campbell 2010). This new generation of
mining codes has been explicitly designed to attract foreign investment in the mining
sec tor and offers significant benefits to investors such as tax exemptions and low-revenue
payments. 
Senegal is an exemplary case of this current dynamic. The mining industry was poorly
developed until the beginning of the 2000s. In 2003, the government of former president
Wade introduced a new mining code offering large benefits to investors, such as tax and
custom duty exemptions as well as revenue payments of only three percent (Code Minier,
Loi n° 2003-36, 24 November 2003). The liberalization of the mining law and rising gold
prices have proven to be significant incentives for large- and medium-scale companies.
Gold mining in Senegal takes place in Kédougou, a poor and sparsely populated region
bordering Mali and Guinea, about 800 km south-east of the capital Dakar. 
The gold deposits in Kédougou have not only attracted international companies but also
large numbers of artisanal and small-scale miners, many of whom migrate from
neigh bor ing countries. Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) has a long history in the
Ké dougou region, as in most West African countries on the Birimian belt. Gold has been
mined artisanally in Senegal since pre-colonial times. ASM was traditionally practiced
by the local population as an additional livelihood activity next to agriculture and
pas toral ism in the dry season, mainly in the form of gold panning of surface sands along
river streams (Niang 2014). However, driven by the high gold prices and the lack of
ef fi cient regulation of ASM by the Senegalese state, tens of thousands of migrants from
other West African countries have travelled to Kédougou in search of gold. Their exact
number is unknown as is the amount of gold they mine. However, the population of some
villages where larger gold deposits have been found has in recent times risen from a few
hundred inhabitants to between 15,000-50,000 inhabitants (Focus group discussion,
ar ti sanal miners, 13 April 2016, Kharakhena). Furthermore, many of the local villagers
have oriented their primary livelihood activities towards ASM. The NGO La Lumière
es timates that in the rural Kédougou area today, around 60% of household income is
de rived from ASM and around 40% from agricultural or pastoralist activities (Interview,
La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). Despite recent attempts by the Senegalese
gov ernment to regularize the sector through a police-enforced hold on all ASM operations,
the demarcation of corridors reserved for ASM, and the granting of licenses solely to
Senegalese citizens, informal mining in Senegal continues to be widespread. Thus the
vast majority of artisanal miners have no security of tenure or legal entitlement to work
a plot of land, and consequently no grounds upon which to receive compensation pay-
ments if an industrial mining company is granted a concession to the land.
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Senegal’s first industrial gold mine, known as Sabodala, began production in 2009. Today
the mine is owned by the Canadian Teranga Gold Corporation (TGO). TGO holds (via
its Senegalese subsidiaries Sabodala Gold Operations and the Sabodala Mining Company)
a mining permit for 246 km2 and exploration licenses for over 1,000 km2 (Teranga Gold
Corporation 2013). From 2013 to 2015, TGO produced between 5 and 6 tons of gold
an nually. 
The installation of the first large-scale gold mine in Senegal has not gone uncontested.
Conflicts have arisen around several issues, though one topic that has kept arising since
the mine began production is the closing down of the ASM sites on the TGO concession.
Local villagers, supported by a few local NGOs based in Kédougou such as La Lumière,
SADEV and KEOH, demand secure access to their ASM sites and have requested land
and monetary compensation for the mines they have lost. Their success, however, has so
far been limited. They have been unable to secure access to ASM sites on the TGO
con cession or to obtain satisfactory compensation lands for the local population. National
media attention has also been limited to concrete protest events, while the international
media has hardly reported on the matter. The only two major international NGOs that
have taken an active part in either funding local organizations or in publishing their
con cerns are Oxfam International and Amnesty International. However, unlike the anti-
land grab coalition against the Senhuile project, this has not yet led to sustained long-
term cooperation and collaborative international campaigns. Rather, TGO has continued
to expand their operations, receiving continued support from the national government of
Senegal and from regional government authorities. 
TGO’s ‘sustainable mining frame’
Supporters of the Sabodala gold mine, the company itself as well as state officials present
their land use as responsible, sustainable and a motor for development. They frame their
activities under a ‘sustainable mining frame’, referring to themselves as a “responsible
partner in sustainable resource development” (Teranga Gold Corporation 2015: 6). As
the TGO Chairman and CEO state, “responsible mining is the way we do business. It is
part of our culture and embodies our core values of integrity, care, respect, collaboration,
performance and communication” (ibid.: 7). The company presents its corporate strategy
as grounded in democratic practice through community consultations and thus as being
responsive to the local people’s needs (Groenewald 2015). They frame their activities as
fostering economic development and growth in the region. TGO stresses that the
com mu nities profit from job creation, revenue payments and CSR programs, such as the
construction of schools and community gardens. The company describes the aims of its
activities in its 2013 Responsibility Report as being “To make a positive difference in the
communities in which we live and work and to share the benefits of our mining presence
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to leave a lasting, positive legacy that will continue to be enjoyed for generations to come”
(Teranga Gold Corporation 2013: 4). TGO also frames its activities as being beneficial
to the development of the nation as a whole. They state that “Teranga works in close
part nership with the Government of Senegal towards the achievement of its Emerging
Senegal Plan goals” (Teranga Gold Corporation 2015: 13).  They stress their financial
contributions through revenues, taxes and investment in infrastructure, and thereby their
investment in national development.
The communities around the mine are portrayed as having been poor and cut off from
the economic development of the country until the Sabodala mine was opened
(Groe newald 2015). Former land use is mostly portrayed as small-scale agriculture and
pastoralism. ASM is acknowledged to exist, though it is portrayed as an anarchic activity
that constitutes a major impediment to the development of the region. The company
de scribes ASM as an “illegal semi‐industrial activity” and criminalizes miners for their
illegal infringement on concession land (Teranga Gold Corporation 29 February 2016;
Interview, representative TGO, 04 March 2016, Sabodala). Furthermore, TGO presents
ASM as an activity largely driven by migrants and stresses its “negative environmental
and social impacts to nearby communities including a rise in crime, violence and health
issues (…)” (Teranga Gold Corporation 29 February 2016). 
Artisanal miners are not only accused of having deficient rules and regulations, but are
also critiqued for their irresponsible use of mercury and cyanide and lack of accountability
for environmental degradation (Interview, Forestry Department, 03 March 2015,
Ké dougou). State officials frequently portray artisanal miners as environmental criminals
and hold them responsible for the contamination of groundwater through the use of
mer cury and for deforestation in the area (Interview, Forestry Department, 03 March
2015, Kédougou; Interview, Mining Ministry, 16 February 2015, Dakar). TGO, on the
other hand, presents itself as capable of managing the environmental risks of large-scale
mining. They refer to their water management scheme, which according to them guaran-
tees that the water used for mining is recycled and never returned to the environment
(Teranga Gold Corporation 2015: 20). 
In their framing, TGO manages to tap into all three discursive opportunities regarding
large-scale land transformations for mining purposes. In presenting their activities as
re sponsible, sustainable and responsive to community demands, they effectively present
large-scale mining as a development potential for local communities rather than a social
risk. Furthermore, they manage to portray large-scale mining as environmentally risk
free, since the company has the know-how and the financial capacities to ‘manage’ the
environmental risks. They contrast this self-image with artisanal miners, whom they
por tray as environmental criminals who recklessly use mercury and cyanide and thus
contribute to the contamination of groundwater and streams in the area. Furthermore,
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TGO and ministry officials stress the presence of migrants in the ASM sector (Teranga
Gold Corporation 2015; Teranga Gold Corporation 27 May 2014; Interview, Mining
Min istry, 16 February 2015, Dakar). Supporters of large-scale mining take up the DOS
of national development in their focus on the company’s financial contributions to and
its cooperation with the national state. As such, they contrast their activities – that benefit
the entire nation – with ASM – that mainly benefits migrant workers from neighboring
countries who export their winnings directly. Their framing is consistent and backed by
a large number of reports and studies issued by the company’s CSR department, which
lends their framing empirical credibility. 
‘Social Justice’: The framing strategies of artisanal miners
To advance land and compensation claims for the local population, civil society actors
and local community groups have constructed a ‘social justice frame’. They argue that
the main problem is that local communities have lost access to their traditional mining
sites through TGO’s mining concessions, and that this poses a major threat to their
liveli hoods. With regard to the closure of the Gora site – a rich ASM site on the TGO
concession – they assert that without being granted an alternative corridor as compen-
sa tion, the local population has no means to guarantee its food supply (Interview,
rep re sentative of the villages surrounding Gora, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). They
fur thermore point to the poverty of the local population in comparison to the fenced
fa cil i ties of the mine and its high production total. They emphasize that the villages next
to the mine do not even have access to electricity or a water supply, while in the mine
“even the toilets are air conditioned” (Interview, La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou).
NGO representatives stress the fact that the areas “that are rich in gold, are the areas
para doxically poor” (In terview, Comité Sénégalais des Droits Humains, 05 February
2015, Dakar). 
Local NGOs also attack the way in which the mine was implemented. They refer to the
environmental and social impact study that was issued only after the mine began
pro duc tion and stress the fact that the allocation of the concession did not allow for any
real par ticipation in Senegal (Interview, La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). In their
di agnostic framing, they thus present the way in which the mine was implemented, as
well as its consequences, as unjust. They cast doubt over Teranga’s representation of the
mine as contributing to local development and being responsive to local people’s needs.
Referring in their own terms to national development, NGOs emphasize the low revenue
payments made by TGO and the large tax exemptions granted to it. They argue that TGO’s
activities mainly profit the company, not the nation, and that the local population bears
the entire costs of the operations (Interview, La Lumière, 05 March 2015, Kédougou). 
The artisanal miners working near to, or displaced from, the Sabodala gold mine
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con ces sion construct their own identity, not explicitly as artisanal miners but as local
communities engaged in farming, cattle herding and ASM. They legitimate their claims
to the land by stating that they hold traditional land rights to certain plots that are now
part of the TGO concession and that they were not consulted prior to the allocation of the
land to TGO. The artisanal miners refer to the long tradition of ASM in the region that
predates gold extraction by large-scale and foreign operators. The chief of Sabodala, a
village that lost its main traditional mining site to TGO, states that “Our fathers and the
fathers of our fathers have done ASM here” (Focus group, inhabitants of Sabodala village,
04 March 2015, Sabodala village). Furthermore, the local communities present themselves
as the ‘true explorers’ of the gold deposits in Senegal, claiming that industrial mining
companies only came to the area because the artisanal miners had discovered the gold
deposits first (Focus group, villagers of Faloumbou, 04 March 2015, Faloumbou). In
re ferring to the long tradition of ASM in the region, the artisanal miners not only point to
their traditional land rights but also present ASM as a traditional and normal economic
activity that has always been a central part of their livelihood activities, alongside small-
scale agriculture and pastoralism. Even though the artisanal miners are aware that their
activities are illegal, they nevertheless present them as legitimate.
With their framing, local communities and their NGO supporters manage to tap into the
DOS on social risks. In emphasizing the contrasts between the high-tech TGO site and
the surrounding villages without electricity or water supply, they present a counter-frame
to TGO’s narrative of responsible mining for local development. They back up their land
claims by referring to their need for access to land for survival. Furthermore, local
ar ti sanal miners and their NGO supporters try to construct a counter-frame to the negative
image of ASM, by presenting it as a traditional and normal part of their livelihood port-
folio. They identify themselves not explicitly as artisanal miners but as local communities
and inhabitants. Thus they try to circumvent the negative images attached to the identity
of artisanal miners in terms of environmental impacts, and aim to distinguish themselves
from migrant artisanal miners. 
Due to the heavy negative environmental impacts of ASM, however, they have not
man aged to construct an effective counter-frame to their representation by TGO and state
officials as environmental criminals. Local communities have after all no opportunity to
present themselves as environmentally more friendly than the TGO operation and thus
cannot align their frames with the discursive structure on environmental risks. Unlike the
agro-pastoralists in the Senhuile case, they have also not managed to present ASM as an
economic alternative to TGO’s operations that could make a better contribution to national
development objectives. On the one hand, they cannot compete with the production levels
and investments of TGO. On the other hand, they have not managed to construct a
de vel opment vision based on ASM. On the contrary, they also put forward the idea of
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sustainable large-scale mining, only with a slight reinterpretation of what sustainable
means with regard to local development and social risks. 
Opponents of the large-scale TGO mine have therefore not managed to create a frame
that resonates with the broader discursive structure on mining in Senegal. Their framing
lacks salience and cultural resonance and their land claims are neither portrayed as
sen si ble nor realistic in the national media. Their framing efforts are further weakened
by frictions among the actors supporting the local communities around the TGO project.
Amnesty International, as an international NGO, has opted for a human rights frame to
advance the claims of the local communities. However, in their framing they focus on
land claims with regard to agricultural land, and they support compensation claims in
cases of resettlement. At the same time, however, they acknowledge frequent human
rights violations such as child labor in ASM activities, and as such exclude land access
claims to ASM sites from their framing (Amnesty International 2014). 
Conclusion: Explaining the success or failure of social move-
ments’ framing strategies
Why do some framing strategies put forward by social movement actors succeed while
others fail, even though the movements may be mobilized in a similar national and
cul tural context? This article aims to contribute to the research on meaning construction
in conflicts over large-scale land transformations. It goes beyond existing studies by
em pirically analyzing how dominant discourses differ according to the purpose of land
valorization and how in turn social movement actors are able to take up these incentives
and constraints to explain the success and failure of their framing strategies. Conceptually,
the article aims to intervene in the debate on framing in social movement theory. I argue
that we need to combine the concept of framing with the concept of DOS in order to
un derstand the differences in the outcomes of framing strategies. I define DOS as
in sti tu tionally anchored ways of thinking (Ferree 2003) and demonstrate that these can
be operationalized for the empirical analysis of conflicts in terms of laws and policies. 
The empirical analysis of DOS and framing contests in conflicts over agro-industrial and
mining projects in Senegal has shown that even for movements that formulate similar
claims – in this case access to land – discursive structures can vary in the same cultural
and national context. In the agricultural sector, an important discursive structure is
cen tered on the principle of food security and national food production, a development
objective that is not transferable to other land uses such as mining. DOS are thus not
ar bi trary but are tied to the specific purpose of land valorization. As such, different
dis courses provide distinct opportunities for movement actors involved in struggles over
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large-scale land transformation in different economic sectors, thus explaining the success
or failure of their respective framing strategies. 
Differences in the DOS only partially explain framing outcomes, however, since not all
social movement actors can use DOS in the same way. Different movement actors are
more or less well positioned to tap into existing DOS. While the anti-land grab coalition
CRAFS was able to take up opportunities opened up by discourses on social and envi ron-
mental risks, the local miners mobilizing around the TGO industrial gold mine could only
tap into the DOS on social risks. The negative impacts of ASM for the environment were
successfully taken up by the supporters of the TGO mine as a frame. They discredited
artisanal miners as environmental criminals due to groundwater contamination through
extensive use of mercury and cyanide and the depletion of forestry resources. 
Whether social movement actors are able to successfully align their framing strategies
with the discursive opportunities is thus constrained on the one hand by their own
ob jec tives – in this case the land use they put forward as an alternative vision to the large-
scale land transformation in question – but also by the counter-framing strategies of their
op po nents. Framing efforts can be further weakened by frictions in the representations
of and support for claims within civil society coalitions (Pye 2010). To provide a com-
prehensive explanation of the success and failure of social movement actors’ framing
strategies, we thus need to carefully combine the concepts of DOS and framing, thereby
paying close attention to the actors involved in the framing contests and their respective
claims. 
The comprehensive features of the DOS that I observed in Senegal, namely those tied to
questions of environmental and social risks, have been highlighted by other authors
work ing on conflicts related to mining (Luning 2014; Buchanan 2013) or to struggles
over the introduction of GMO crops (Motta 2015) in different national contexts. This
suggests that discursive structures tied to large-scale land transformations might have
some comparable features that are, nevertheless, supplemented by other components
de pending on the land transformation in question. These features could be explained by
the strong influence of transnational treaties, as Motta (2015) suggests, or by the strong
impact of international agencies on land-related policies in the Global South. Many of
the mining laws in West Africa, for example, have been reformed in the past 20 years
with support from the World Bank (Campbell 2010).
I argue that neither differences in the DOS nor the framing choices of social movement
actors can alone explain the outcomes of framing contests. Instead, framing contests need
to be carefully analyzed within and together with the discursive structure in which they
are embedded. Combining these two concepts provides an important step forward in the
empirical analysis of meaning constructions and discourses in conflicts over large-scale
land transformations. It offers a concept that is empirically more manageable than the
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more elusive concepts of hegemonic or dominant discourses so often used by scholars
working on conflicts over mining and agro-industrial projects (Buchanan 2013;
Haarstad/Fløysand 2007; Davidov 2014; Hundsberger/Alonso-Fradejas 2016). Here,
hegemonic discourses are often implicitly derived from the frames that social movement
actors use, presuming that they are trying to tap into powerful discourses. By grounding
discourses in institutionalized practices, the concept of DOS allows for an independent
identification of dominant discourses with regard to specific topics. This framework is
highly useful for analyzing the outcomes of framing contests, though it does not
nec es sar ily allow for more general statements of movements’ successes or failures in
terms of conflicts over large-scale land transformations. To do this, we need to extend
the analysis to include actor constellations, power, financial and organizational resources,
and political opportunities. 
Conceptually, DOS is a suitable tool for overcoming one of the central weaknesses of the
framing approach: success and failure are often explained as a result of the actors’ skill-
fulness in constructing frames, ignoring the structural constraints produced by the
dis cur sive context. DOS provides an important tool with which to grapple with the often
vague notion of discursive context. Nevertheless, the concept of DOS remains imprecise,
and more work is needed on the conceptualization of the terms discourse, discursive
struc ture and discursive opportunity, as to date it is still unclear what makes a discursive
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